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Abstract
Since Bosnia and Herzegovina’s declaration of independence in 1995, its path 
has been a rocky one. Unwillingness by the international community to stand by 
the central government and stand in the way of the neighboring states of Serbia 
and Croatia’s territorial pretensions, produced a succession of ceasefire agree-
ments, culminating in the final, Dayton Peace Agreement. Each of these agree-
ments espoused the ethnic principle as the guiding philosophy for the organiza-
tion of the state. The post-war period demonstrates that despite the passage of 
time, the principle of organization of multi-ethnic state along ethnic lines pres-
ents a stumbling block to the functioning of the political, economic and social 
life in the country. The political history of post-independence Bosnia and Herze-
govina (B&H) therefore reads as a history of protracted political paralysis, with 
no hope of rectifying the problems without another forceful intervention of the 
international community. 
Introduction: Setting the Political Framework1
In terms of territory, the inaccessibility and impenetrability of mountain ranges 
that cover most of its territory, have from an early age, defined Bosnia as a sepa-
rate geopolitical entity. Partially due its extremely rugged terrain, Bosnia has for 
centuries, provided sanctuary to peoples and refugees fleeing persecution in sur-
rounding areas. However, despite the resulting tribal, ethnic and religious diversi-
ty, Bosnia has remained throughout history, a largely peaceful entity with next to 
no recorded internal strife. Despite occurrences of religiously and ethnically mo-
tivated disturbances in the late Ottoman Era and during the Second World War, 
the ethnic divisions that define modern Bosnia, could rightfully be considered 
a recent development. In the post-WWII period, right until his death, Yugoslav 
leader Tito often hailed Bosnia as the most successful example of coexistence, a 
kind of ‘melting pot’ of different nationalities. 
The internal social and political consensus in B&H started to deteriorate as the 
Communist Party’s hold on power in Yugoslavia weakened in the period follow-
ing Tito’s death in 1980. With no unifying and inspirational force, which Tito had 
represented, nationalist passions were again awakened, having been suppressed 
since the end of the Second World War. Serbian nationalists felt that the time had 
come to reestablish their traditional dominance in Yugoslav affairs, which had 
been somewhat dimmed by Tito’s policy of even-handed treatment of the coun-
try’s various ethnic groups. The Serbian Orthodox Church assumed prominent 
unifying role in creating something akin to a national renaissance amongst all 
those Serbs still living in different Yugoslav republics. The unification agenda 
1 Parts of this article have been adopted from the book chapter “Bosnia and Herzegovina” by the 
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often took the form of reacting to supposed attempts at weakening of Serbian 
‘nation’ outside Serbia, often alleging forced cultural and linguistic assimilation 
by others. This was particularly the case in Kosovo, where a strong Albanian 
majority had long contested Serb political control, but which Serbian nationalists 
perceived as the cradle of their statehood and civilization. As the Serbian na-
tionalist movement grew stronger, its leading exponents set their eyes westward 
towards B&H and Croatia, in which sizeable Serb minorities lived.2 Since Mus-
lims formed a relative majority in Bosnia, it was fairly easy for the Serb media to 
fuel irrational fears of Islamic ‘conspiracy’ bent on subverting, or even ‘Islamiz-
ing’ local Serb population.3 Among the early victims of this anti-Muslim hys-
teria were thirteen ‘fundamentalists’, who were sentenced to long prison terms 
in a show trial in Sarajevo in 1983, being accused of motley mixture of crimes, 
including “advocating western-style democracy” and “plotting to establish an Is-
lamic state in Bosnia” (Friedman, 1996: 192-198; Silber and Little, 1996: 233) 
The main defendant in the trial was Alija Izetbegović, who was later to become 
the first President of independent B&H. 
Serbian nationalism became official policy, with its modern program laid out in 
the now-infamous ‘Memorandum,’ drafted by the Serbian Academy of Arts and 
Sciences in 1986 (Pinson, 1996: 146). The Memorandum’s basic argument was 
that non-Serb nations in Yugoslavia (notably Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Monte-
negrins, Albanians and Macedonians) were either of recent origin or artificially 
created by Communists in order to act as a counterweight to Serbs. Serbs, on 
the other side, ‘historically’ possessed the rights to statehood in across most of 
the area now covered by the state called Yugoslavia. It became policy that Serb 
national rights preceded the rights of any other nation in Yugoslavia. In a chilling 
proclamation, the Memorandum stated that “the question of the integrity of the 
Serb people and its culture in the whole of Yugoslavia poses itself as a crucial 
question for that people’s survival and development (Malcolm, 1996: 207).” 
Sliding from crisis to crisis, economically, politically and socially, by the end of 
the 1980s it became painfully obvious that Yugoslavia, although relatively free 
and moderate when compared to the other regimes in Eastern Europe, had to 
2 According to the 1991 Yugoslav census data, Serbs formed 31% of population in Bosnia and 
12% in Croatia. Source: Bosnian Congress web site at http://www.hdmagazine.com/bosnia/cen-
sus/cens-sum.html
3 It has to be noted however, that ‘Bosnian Muslim’ is an unfortunate ethnic, and not religious, de-
terminant, given to them by Yugoslav communists in 1971, instead of historical term ‘Bosniak.’ 
Most Bosnian Muslims were thoroughly secularized after nearly half a century of communist 
rule and possessed only a remote intellectual and cultural connection with the rest of the Islam-
ic world, as witnessed by some sociological surveys that put the number of practicing Muslims 
in Bosnia in 1985 at mere 17% of their total number (Burg and Shoup, 1999: 42). To speak of 
the rising Islamization and radicalization of Bosnian Muslims at that time therefore represents a 
gross exaggeration, if not outright falsification of the true situation.
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reform its ossified and ultimately inflexible political system. The need for reform 
was made more urgent by the fact that, to larger extent than most other Eastern 
European countries, Yugoslavia was an inherently unstable amalgamate of sev-
eral ethnic groups, most of which retained strong historic memory of indepen-
dence and statehood. Also, contrary to the claims of Serbian radical nationalist 
advocates, Serbs did dominate most aspects of life in Yugoslav society, much to 
the chagrin of the other, recently awakened, ethnic groups. 
However, repeated attempts at redefining the relationship between federal re-
publics, and between the republics and the capital, Belgrade, failed. This was 
primarily due to the uncompromising stance of Serbian hard line nationalists, 
empowered by the rise of Slobodan Milošević, who became leader of the Serbian 
Communist Party in 1987. This was followed by his election to the post of the 
President of Serbia in 1989. Fearing the loss of privileges stemming from their 
preeminent position in Yugoslavia, Serbs continually rejected efforts to decen-
tralize power in the favor of individual republics, which eventually led to the 
strengthening of pro-independence forces throughout the country. Towards the 
end of the 1980s, a wave of anti-communist revolutions swept throughout East-
ern Europe, very much challenging the socialist political order in Yugoslavia as 
well. The Communist party’s (or rather ‘parties’’, since parties were organized on 
the republic level) sway over society was also weakened by severe and protracted 
economic crisis that beset Yugoslavia for most of the preceding decade. 
Against such a tense backdrop, the two westernmost Yugoslav republics, Slove-
nia and Croatia, held their first-ever multiparty elections in 1990, in which the 
triumph of the pro-independence parties was virtually guaranteed. Later in the 
same year, Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted its own elections, in which three 
national(ist) parties together won more than 75 percent of the parliamentary seats 
(Arnautović, 1996: 108). Since elections in these three republics reduced their 
Communist Parties to insignificance, Milošević was forced to abandon his initial 
plan to ensure continuing domination of the country by controlling the Alliance 
of Yugoslav Communists (the umbrella organization of republic communist par-
ties). Instead he embraced the old idea of creating the state of Greater Serbia by 
carving out the Serb-populated areas in neighboring republics and adjoining them 
to Serbia proper. 
To accomplish this ambitious goal, Milošević needed to politically mobilize 
the Serb population in all the areas where they lived in significant numbers. To 
this end, he employed Serbian media, which was purged of his opponents in 
the early stages of his ‘anti-bureaucratic’ campaign, in order to gain control of 
important institutions of power in Serbia (including the autonomous provinces 
of Kosovo and Vojvodina, whose autonomy was severely curtailed, starting in 
1989), and Montenegro (Donia and Antwerp Fine, 1994: 204-206). State televi-
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barding their target audience with carefully orchestrated propaganda, designed 
to make them believe that in the event of the collapse of a common state, Serbs 
living outside Serbia proper will be subjected to genocide and virtual annihilation 
(Thompson, 1994). Precedent for this scenario was found in the WWII pogroms 
of Serb population living in territories controlled by the quisling Nazi regime of 
the so-called Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna država Hrvatska – NDH). 
Slovenia was left out of Milošević’s campaigns however, due to the fact that 
barely any Serbs lived there, but in Croatia, Milošević actively sponsored nation-
alist forces that eventually started armed rebellion in the Serb-dominated Krajina 
region. The same recipe of instigating rebellions by local Serbian population, 
allegedly fearing reprisals if separated from mainland Serbia, was repeated in 
Bosnia a few months later (Donia and Antwerp Fine, 1994: 215-217). 
The situation in Bosnia was much more complex than in any other republic in 
former Yugoslavia. Except in a handful of villages, no ethnic group in B&H 
dominated any large area exclusively. Indeed, this central republic had the most 
ethnically mixed population in former Yugoslavia. (Donia and Antwerp Fine, 
1994: 186; Burg and Shoup, 1999: 44). The Bosnian government was conscious 
of the delicate position that their republic had in relation to other Yugoslav fed-
eral republics and tried hard to contribute to negotiating some sort of confed-
erate solution for Yugoslavia, which would allow it to avoid contemplating an 
independence that was guaranteed to arouse Serb passions. However, after the 
European Community recognized Slovenia and Croatia as independent states in 
January 1992, the Bosnian position in a rump Yugoslavia, with its resulting huge 
Serb majority, became untenable. The decision was thus made by the parliament 
to hold the referendum for independence in March 1992. Altogether, 64 percent 
of the registered voters participated, of whom 98 percent voted in favor of the 
independence. The percentage of participating voters in effect meant that Serbs 
who favoured independence (comprising 31% of the total population), had no 
chance of winning, and subsequently boycotted the referendum (Begić, 1997: 
71-79; Donia and Antwerp Fine, 1994: 230-238). 
Following the declaration of independence and formal recognition by the Euro-
pean Union and the United States on 6 April 1992, the Serbs started an armed in-
surrection against the B&H central government, applying the same methods they 
used in Croatia. The rebellious Serb population took over local government insti-
tutions in coordination with the Yugoslav Army, which was by this time almost 
completely taken over by the Serb officers following defections and purges of 
non-Serb cadres. The government in Sarajevo lacked means to effectively coun-
ter such thoroughly prepared and organized rebellion. It did not have an army 
and when the sporadic clashes soon turned into full-scale war, the government 
could count on the support of little more than a variety of neighborhood-based 
volunteer defense groups, as well as Muslim elements in the police. However, 
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the various police forces themselves were in state of complete disarray, following 
Serb defections and takeover of police weapons stockpiles by the Yugoslav Army. 
The combined countrywide strength of these various defense elements was prob-
ably in the range of 5,000 – 8,000, equipped only with small arms individually 
purchased on the black market, but also lacking effective organization, leadership 
and completely devoid of strategic and tactical planning, control and oversight. 
Such ad-hoc volunteer defenders faced professional federal army troops already 
garrisoned in almost every town across the country, reinforced by reservist units 
and paramilitaries sent in from Serbia, totaling approximately 80,000 men in 
1992 (United Nations Commission of Experts, 1994). As B&H became an in-
ternationally recognized independent state, the presidents of Serbia and recently 
proclaimed Bosnian Serb Republic, Slobodan Milošević and Radovan Karadžić, 
officially announced the departure of federal army troops from B&H, with the 
provision that any personnel wishing to remain there and continue fighting would 
become part of newly formed Army of Serbian Republic. This official separation 
of two armies was of course a mere public relations exercise, designed to absolve 
Milošević of responsibility for the aggression against a neighboring state, and to 
support claims that the conflict in Bosnia was merely civil war between different 
ethnic groups, rather than an attack on one sovereign state by another. The sad 
part of the story is that the international community, unwilling to get involved in 
the developing conflict, willingly bought into this lie. Illustration of this can be 
found in the official report issued by UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali in June 
1992, which stated unequivocally that Serb forces in Bosnia were “independent 
and had nothing to do with Belgrade” (Malcolm, 1996: 242).
The rationale for the perpetuation of such a shameful stance, seeking to uphold 
the fantasy of a civil war for which all sides are equally to be blamed, is clear 
from the words of EC chief negotiator Lord Carrington in early 1992: “everybody 
is to blame for what is happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as soon as we 
get the ceasefire there will be no need to blame anybody” (Malcolm, 1996: 242). 
The most poignant policy, however, of the international community in relation 
to the war in Bosnia remained its constant refusal to lift the arms embargo on 
Bosnian government to allow it to equip its forces and defend the country against 
aggression. Various arguments had been put forward to justify denying Bosnians 
their natural right to defend their lives and property, most common of which 
was that allowing government to arm its forces would only serve to ‘prolong the 
fighting.’ As Francine Friedman brilliantly observed later on; “the international 
community thus obviously preferred the peacefulness of the graveyard to ‘messy’ 
job of helping the cause of justice” (Friedman, 1996: 223). 
To appease their critics and pacify public opinion, disturbed by the nightly TV 
spectacle of an entire nation being ‘ethnically cleansed,’ (newspeak for industrial-
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the mandate of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) from Serb-held areas in 
Croatia, to all of B&H in September 1992. UNPROFOR, however, was tasked 
solely with facilitating the provision of humanitarian aid in the region by protect-
ing aid convoys run by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). In-
stead of genuinely intervening to help the nation in distress, UNPROFOR served 
to create media-friendly show of international community hard at work to pro-
vide assistance to those in need. 
One, however, has to be fair in judging the response of the international com-
munity to the war in Bosnia by taking into account the fact that these develop-
ments were happening against the backdrop of the seismic shift in the hitherto 
prevailing world order – the collapse of communism; the breaking apart of the 
Soviet Union; and sudden disappearance of the Iron Curtain and the opening of 
the Eastern European countries. Against the prospect of European unification that 
until very recently seemed unthinkable, the complex conflict in tiny country on 
the European fringe paled in significance. Europe and the United States there-
fore moved from trying to fundamentally understand and resolve the conflict, 
to attempting to contain it and seek any kind of resolution that would revert the 
country to peace. 
In such fashion, seeking an early end to the war, but without trying to address 
the complicated issues that led to the conflict in the first place, the UN and the 
European Community chief negotiators Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, produced 
the first comprehensive attempt for a political and military solution to the war in 
B&H, the ‘Vance-Owen peace plan’, which was made public at peace talks in 
Geneva in January 1993. The plan envisioned the division of Bosnia into a set of 
nine ethnically defined provinces plus a capital district for Sarajevo (Campbell, 
1999). This ethnic labeling of territories caused the outbreak, for the first time, of 
an actual civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with all three sides competing for 
control of territory, prior to envisioned partitioning. In Noel Malcolm’s words, it 
was also “after the arms embargo, … the second most important contribution of 
the West to the destruction of Bosnia” (Malcolm, 1996: 248).
Due to the obvious impossibility of its realization, the international community 
eventually quietly dropped the Vance-Owen proposals and moved on to draw a 
new plan for division of Bosnia into three ethnic republics, put forward in Septem-
ber 1993. Western acceptance of the new plan cemented the shift from assisting 
the nation, a victim of an aggression, to downgrading the problem to something 
akin to modern-day tribal conflict was completed. Ever since David Owen pub-
licly ridiculed as “unrealistic” the Bosnian government’s official stance that “any 
federal arrangement should be based on equality for all citizens and equal rights 
for the constituent nations, and that the federal units could not be divided exclu-
sively along ethnic lines,” nothing better than another ethnic division of Bosnian 
territory by the international community could be expected (Campbell, 1999).
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The starting position of the new plan, known as the ‘Owen-Stoltenberg Plan’ (af-
ter the former Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg replaced Cyrus 
Vance) foresaw the division of B&H into a Serb republic (Republika Srpska), 
who were to be allocated 53% of the territory, a Muslim entity (Muslim Repub-
lic) with at least 30% and a Croat unit (Herceg Bosna) with 17% (Vranić, 2013: 
52). The proposal ultimately failed, but what the EU negotiators did achieve 
was agreement on the percentage of Bosnian territory that would be allocated to 
each side under the terms of eventual peace agreement. Bosnian Muslims were 
‘awarded’ 33.3 percent of the territory, Croats got 17.5 percent (together control-
ling approximately 51 percent of Bosnia), while Serbs got 49 percent (Holbrooke, 
1999: 296).
Faced with irrefutable evidence of Serbian atrocities, growing tired of media pres-
sure at home, and fed up with Europeans’ demonstrable inability to put an end to 
the conflict in BiH, the American administration eventually moved in forcefully 
to resolve the conflict. The first result of increasing American involvement was 
reconciliation between Bosniaks and Croats, who were allied in the beginning of 
the conflict but went to war over the control of territory in the Spring of 1993, 
after the Vance-Owen peace plan was put forward. The reconciliation effort was 
crowned by the signing of the Washington Agreement in March 1994. Besides 
the pressure from the United States, signing of the Agreement was made possible 
due to Bosniak’s eagerness to end the war on two fronts and the Croats’ failure 
to achieve their main military objective – linking the Croat-held territories in 
Western Herzegovina and the Central Bosnia regions (United States Institute of 
Peace, 1994). Eventually, riding on the wave of international outrage over Serb 
atrocities, the American-led NATO forces intervened by commencing air strikes 
against Bosnian Serb positions on 30 September 1995. Faced with the prospect 
of military ruin at the hands of Bosniak-Croat alliance supported by NATO, Serbs 
were forced to accept American-led negotiations to bring the conflict in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to an end. 
The international community, i.e. the West, clearly played a pivotal role from the 
onset of the crisis in B&H. This was partly due to the weakness of the country’s 
central government, which had had no time to establish necessary institutions and 
assert its authority in the short period between the declaration of independence 
and the beginning of Serbian aggression. The history of the war in B&H also 
serves as a depressing reading into the international community’s truly mind-
boggling incompetence and indiscriminate application of double standards in 
dealing with aggressors and victims of the conflict. It comes as no surprise then 
that the peace agreement that ultimately succeeded in ending the war in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina did not turn out to be an ambitious project to restore the law and 
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inspiring attempt to use minimum effort required to reconcile all warring parties 
by promising them any concession necessary to guarantee their goodwill. 
With American-led air strikes providing a compelling argument for the Serbs to 
sit at the negotiating table, a peace conference was convened on 1 November 
1995 in Dayton, Ohio. It brought together all three sides in the Bosnian con-
flict, presidents of Serbia and Croatia, as well as representatives of the European 
Union and Russia. However, it was obvious from the very beginning that the 
American delegation would play a key role in negotiations, with the European 
and Russian representatives relegated to the sidelines. The 21-day conference 
entered diplomatic history as a synonym for the “Big Bang approach to negotia-
tions” (Holbrooke, 1999: 232).
The Dayton Agreement consists of a series of provisions designed to achieve 
lasting peace in BiH. It also outlines, in the annexes, the political framework for 
the redesigned post-war country. The most important annex of the Dayton Agree-
ment is Annex 4, which contains the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
This Annex spells out the essence of the political reforms of the Agreement. Un-
der the terms of the new constitution, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
continued its legal existence under the name ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ Article 
I-3 radically reforms the political framework of the country, creating  the two 
‘Entities,’ the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The 
de facto partitioning of the state into the Croat-Bosniak Federation and the Serb 
Republic represents a radical departure from the principle of respecting sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina that the international 
community had maintained since 1992.
Although de jure maintaining the semblance of the state, the Dayton Constitution 
mades the Entities responsible for the exercise of most aspects of political pow-
er. Article III-1 limits the responsibilities of B&H’s state institutions to foreign 
policy, foreign trade, customs, monetary policy and a few other, less important 
matters, such as air traffic control. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the same Article, 
however, grant sweeping political powers to the Entities. The Entities are thus 
made responsible for law enforcement and defense affairs (the latter, however, 
eventually became the responsibility of central authorities under intense pressure 
from international community, motivated by security concerns).
The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is subdivided into ten Cantons, which 
provide for the further decentralization of power along ethnic (Croat-Bosniak) 
lines. Indeed, many authors argued that the division of the Federation into Can-
tons was only a camouflage for the establishment of de facto independent Bos-
niak and Croat entities. The proponents of this theory point out that the Cantons 
themselves have elected parliaments and cabinets headed by prime ministers, 
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which exercise substantial political powers in key areas of government, such as 
health, education, law enforcement on the local level, and so on. 
As if this extreme form of decentralization was not enough to satisfy the centrifu-
gal forces in B&H politics, members of each constituent nation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were given ample possibilities to effectively paralyze the function-
ing of the state parliament and other institutions of the central government. The 
ethnic balancing of the proceedings and decision making in the Parliamentary 
Assembly was instituted with the aim of having the three communities cooper-
ate with each other, so that no ethnic group could be excluded from the political 
process. The experience of post-Dayton B&H however, shows that it was the 
nationalist parties who mainly took advantage of these rules, in order to veto any 
decision perceived as being against their interests. The tit-for-tat use of the ethnic 
veto resulted in the effective paralysis of the decision-making process in the gov-
ernment, lasting until the present day. 
Most of the critics of the Dayton Agreement point to the destructive consequences 
of the insistence on “ethnic qualifications for membership in key institutions and 
ethnicized processes of decision making within them” (Burg and Shoup, 1999: 
371). By stressing ethnic parity, the creators of the Dayton Agreement sought to 
prevent the one ethnic group from being dominated and overruled by others. The 
rules of ethnic balancing, they reckoned, will represent a powerful incentive for 
all three parties to engage in cooperative and compromise-seeking politics. In-
stead, it is now clear that the ability of each of the parties within B&H to exercise 
the veto over the decision making process, coupled with the intense mistrust of 
the other parties’ intentions, led to the total paralysis of the political process in 
the country. The only way to break the impasse is to have the High Representa-
tive (an institution introduced in the Dayton and subsequently strengthened) issue 
executive decrees. This has led B&H to the state of being the de facto protectorate 
of the international community, where all historically important decisions break-
ing through the political paralysis had to be made by the High Representative. 
In the postwar period, the European powers gradually became acutely aware of 
the problems that such constitutional arrangements had brought upon the country. 
However, the professed desire of the international community to end the domi-
nation of ethnic political parties in B&H is countered by the rigid constitutional 
provisions behind the ethnic partition of the territory and the decision-making 
process within the country. The stalemate on the ground led even the chief archi-
tect of the Dayton Agreement, US diplomat Richard Holbrooke, to admit that the 
Agreement contained several fundamental flaws. According to Holbrooke, the 
most serious deficiency of the Dayton Agreement was to allow the existence of 
two—therefore opposing—armies in one country, one for the Serbs and one for 
the Bosniak-Croat Federation (Holbrooke, 1999: 361). The second fundamental 
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retain the name Republika Srpska… , to permit the Karadzic to keep the name he 
invented was more a concession than we realized” (Holbrooke, 1999: 361). 
The guiding principles behind the imposition oHoYof the Dayton Agreement and 
the subsequent role of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
have been criticized from often opposing points of view. David Chandler identi-
fies the critics of what he terms the “external dynamic of democratization,” as 
belonging to the two main camps—the Liberal and the Conservative (Chandler, 
1999: 164-192). The essence of the Liberal critique is that the international com-
munity has not gone far enough in its post-war political reconstruction of B&H. 
The Liberals’ view is that the international community was not ready to confront 
the nationalist forces that were responsible for the war, preferring instead to strike 
a compromise deal with them by empowering them through the threefold division 
of the country. In their view, “there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the prob-
lems of the Balkans are seen as culturally determined and historically recurring 
and therefore beyond capable solution” (Chandler, 1999: 164).
Completely opposite approach is employed by the critics of the Dayton Agree-
ment belonging to the Conservative camp. The core substance of the critique 
advanced in the writings of conservative thinkers such as Henry Kissinger, 
Charles Krauthammer and some political analysts at the Cato institute, is that the 
international community has overlooked the fundamental truth on the ground, 
which is that there are, there have always been, and there will most likely remain 
three separate ethnic-based components in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Conserva-
tive political theorists even view the war in Bosnia itself as a direct result of 
an ill-conceived and rushed recognition of Bosnian independence in 1992. The 
Dayton Agreement and subsequent developments served only to artificially ex-
tend the life of an impossible state creation. Kissinger argued that the “same flaw 
that attended the birth of the Bosnian state lies at the heart of the dilemmas of 
the Dayton accords… Its military provisions separating the parties substantially 
along the lines of the ethnic enclaves that emerged as hostilities ceased. But the 
political provisions do the opposite: They seek to unite these enclaves under the 
banner of a multiethnic state that caused the explosion in the first place” (quoted 
in Chandler, 1999: 171). 
Political developments in the post-war period
With cessation of the war being the paramount concern to the creators of the 
Dayton Agreement, the resulting Constitution focused excessively on creating 
the checks and balances system to build interethnic trust in BiH. In effect the 
system this created, bears all the characters of ethnic democracy, with command-
ing rights and privileges are reserved for ethnic groups. Political process thus 
revolves around consensus building which is most often impossible to achieve. 
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Similarly, voting happens mostly along the ethnic lines, with political parties 
viewed primarily as protectors of interests of ethnic groups, all other concerns 
considered secondary. 
As a result of such a peculiar system, the political process in Bosnia after the war 
has been characterized by continuing paralysis (as a result of indiscriminate use 
of national veto instruments on multiple levels of power), and recurring outbursts 
of ethnic mobilization, nationalist rhetoric and populism linked to elections taking 
place every two years. Constructing fear of the ‘other’ as the primary concern in ev-
ery election perpetuates the power of ethno-national elites by allowing them to fo-
cus on issues of symbolic instead of practical nature. In other words, the presumed 
interests of ‘our’ ethnic group and protection against the ‘other’, trumps concern 
about these elites’ dismal performance in almost all truly important aspects of life 
in society – economy, jobs, education, healthcare, future prospects, etc. 
A concordium of nationalist parties have been in power ever since the first post-
war elections in 1996, save for the brief two-year period in 2000-2002, when as 
a result of the forceful intervention of the Americans and the EU, power in the 
Federation passed into the hands of the Alliance for Change, grouping of ten 
reform-minded parties. This brief experiment demonstrated one of the principal 
flaws of the Dayton Constitution – no matter what party is in power, votes of 
their MPs and ministers in country’s many governments continue to be counted 
as votes of one of the three ethnic groups. In other words, you can pursue non-
nationalistic, socialist, or liberal political agenda, but once you are represented in 
the parliament or the government, your vote simply ads up to the tally of votes 
by the ethnic group you belong to. This way, ethnic, or nationalistic consider-
ations always trump other considerations and prevent meaningful political pro-
cesses from taking place. During this brief international intervention in 2000, for 
instance, hundreds of laws and bylaws had been pushed through the country’s 
parliaments, and state and entity constitutions had been amended to ensure equal 
legal standing of all ethnic groups regardless of their place of residence. Despite 
the breakthrough, when the Americans lost interest in Bosnia in post-2001 envi-
ronment, the subsequent elections in 2002 returned the mainstream nationalist 
parties to power where they remained entrenched to the present day (ICG, 2002)
Civic activism
The constitutionally mandated domination of the country’s politics by the nation-
alist parties, produced the long-term effect of alienating the more progressive – 
typically urban – social groups from the political process. The feeling that nothing 
can be changed since the same nationalist parties will always remain in power, 
has produced low turnouts in elections and further weakening of opposition par-
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parties, despite having a nominal ‘socialist’ or ‘prosperity’ orientation, espouse 
hardline nationalist rhetoric and compete on the agenda of whose candidate is 
more of a Serb and who detests Bosnia more. The situation is similar in the Croat 
parts of the Federation, with most voters coalescing around the main HDZ party. 
Bosniak parts of the Federation do maintain some measure of political plurality, 
with parties espousing social democratic, liberal, or youth-related agendas, but 
the political life revolves around the main ethnic party, the SDA, which, despite 
decreasing number of votes, remains relatively the strongest party, and has been 
able to maintain its chief position through alliances with some smaller parties.4 
With typical voter turnout in successive elections hovering just above 50%, it 
is clear that in effect political life of the country is dictated by the rightwing 
minority, who remain loyal voters of nationalist parties. Meanwhile, low spirits, 
fatigue and absenteeism, undermine the desire for political engagement among 
non-nationalist voters. For a long time, both the international community (mostly 
the EU in post-2001 period), together with prominent intellectuals and academ-
ics, voiced hopes that inability to change the system working from within could 
be supplanted, or even replaced, by civic activism. Strong support for the local 
civic sector development translated into donor assisted growth of the nongovern-
mental organizations, usually mobilizing more educated and upward socially mo-
bile urban youth. However, this also produced the unintended effect of alienating 
NGOs from the popular majority, who viewed these organizations as little more 
than toys of privileged few, whose agenda was dictated by the donors (Rašidagić, 
2006 3-12). As a result, while the NGO reports and activities feature prominently 
in academic papers and policy reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina, activities of 
the civic sector had negligible effects on the political or social life of the country. 
Ironically, it was the drying up of the donor financing and disappearance of 
donor-dependent NGOs that finally led to several important developments that 
in retrospect, could be considered as gradual awakening of the civil sector in 
the country. The first such development started on 5 June 2013, when a group 
of citizens occupied the square in front of the state government and parliament 
buildings. More people joined them overnight and the gathering evolved into vir-
tual blockade of the main government complex, with members of the country’s 
parliament, government ministers and bureaucrats being prevented from leaving 
the buildings until the protesters’ demands were met. The reasons behind the pro-
tests was the law on civil registries had lapses, and could not be replaced by the 
new one due, to a dispute over presumed ethnic interests in the state parliament, 
where, for any law to pass, majority of all three ethnic groups have to agree on 
the proposal. In the absence of the law, newborn babies could not be issued with 
identity numbers and hence could not be given passports. When one such baby, 
4 See the website of the Central Electoral Commission of BiH for the election-related statistics: 
www.izbori.ba
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three-month old Berina Hamidović, died as a direct consequence of inability to 
travel abroad where she was to receive urgent medical treatment, public dissatis-
faction exploded. At the height of protests, an estimated 10,000 people gathered 
around the parliament, forcing the politicians from all three sides to work out 
compromise solution and pass an interim measure to resolve the problem. 
This protest was followed by country’s largest ever demonstrations early on in the 
next year, when public dissatisfaction with general living conditions led to dra-
matic instances of public disobedience, culminating in the torching and looting 
of several government buildings in the Federation entity. These protests started 
on 4 February 2014 in Tuzla, begun by workers in the once huge state-owned 
factories, whose status has for years, remained unresolved. The workers in these 
socialist era ‘combinates’ had for years, or even decades, remained officially on 
the payroll, but not actually working since these factories have long been bank-
rupt and lay dormant. Thus the state, on paper, owed the workers years’ worth of 
salaries and insurance payments but couldn’t pay them as factories didn’t actually 
work and make any money. Since no government could muster enough courage 
to formally lay off thousands of workers (and voters!) who haven’t worked in 
decades, the debt accumulated, and huge sums that were owed, on paper, to the 
workers provided rather perverse incentive to demand their rights from the gov-
ernment (Milan, 2015). 
The protests in Tuzla led to large scale protests elsewhere across the Federation, 
with protesters venting their frustration with overall living conditions, unemploy-
ment, government ineptitude and corruption. Most large cities were affected, in-
cluding Zenica, Mostar, Bihać and Sarajevo, where at the height of the crisis, 
a crowd burst into the part of the state Presidency building and torched several 
offices. However, the scale of destruction of property and looting by the criminal 
gangs that infiltrated the demonstrations, scared the majority of population who 
opted to stay away in the days following the initial protests. Leaders of the dem-
onstrations hence channeled their protests into the so-called ‘People Plenums’ 
that were formed in several cities, including Sarajevo. Protesters henceforth 
voiced their frustrations and demands in what the organizers hoped would evolve 
into some sort of proto-parliaments, but after some weeks the initial enthusiasm 
cooled off and plenums disappeared without producing any meaningful impact in 
the political arena (Milan, 2015) (BiH Protest Files, 2014). 
It is important to note here that, while indeed being the largest demonstrations 
that country has ever witnessed, they remain largely limited to Bosniaks in the 
Federation entity. Republika Srpska elites were able to utilize state media under 
their control to portray the demonstrations as Bosniak-led movement, whose anti-
elite actions supposedly translated into anti-Republika Srpska and hence anti-
Serb objectives. The propaganda worked and despite broadly similar, or even 
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only a brief, few hundred strong, protest was held in Banja Luka on the occasion. 
Eventually, the 2014 upheavals served only to reinforce widespread civic apathy 
across the Bosnian population since it was once again demonstrated that no mat-
ter what issues are at stake, ruling parties are able to sway the popular mood and 
mobilize them along the ethnic lines in order to remain in power (Milan, 2015). 
The most recent civic actions that started as expressions of popular frustration, 
but consequently had clear political implications, were the cases of Dženan 
Memić in Sarajevo and David Dragićević in Banja Luka. In both cases, the first 
dating from 2016 and second from 2018, young men were murdered in murky 
circumstance which, according to their parents and widespread public opinion, 
implicated members of political elites and led to clumsy cover-up attempts by the 
corrupt police and judiciary. In both cases, bungled investigations and allegations 
of conspiracies to protect members of the ruling elite, led to widespread protests, 
bringing together thousands of people demanding justice. Allegations that the 
killers are actually the son of a local tycoon linked to the SDA (in Dženan›s case), 
and top police officials involved in drug smuggling (in case of David), fell on 
receptive public ears and transformed these protests into expressions of general 
dissatisfaction with the corrupt elites. The processes are still ongoing, but what is 
important here is that a sad story with human face led, for the first time ever, to 
public expressions of solidarity that transcended entity and ethnic divides. Family 
members of both men travelled on several occasions to attend public demonstra-
tions in Sarajevo and Banja Luka, where they were warmly welcomed by the 
members of public. Whether such rare expressions of inter-ethnic solidarity will 
one day lead to bigger and more comprehensive joint civic activism, remains to 
be seen. 
Conclusion: The Challenges Facing Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Bosnia and Herzegovina today, quarter of a century after the Dayton Agreement 
was signed, suffers from the same degree of paralysis which had necessitated 
introduction of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) as supreme political 
arbiter in the country. However, given the reluctance of the international com-
munity to continue being involved in resolving the country’s continuing crises, 
the High Representatives no longer use their powers to break the political im-
passe. The strengthening of the Serb nationalists in their para-state of Republika 
Srpska, means that the country has once again reached political deadlock. The 
period starting with the 2006 elections is generally considered among the impar-
tial observers of Bosnian politics, as a period of lost opportunities and general 
stagnation, political and otherwise. The European Union, which has emerged as 
the most relevant arbiter of Bosnian politics, illustrates such prevailing opinions 
by issuing a series of warnings to Bosnian politicians, as well as unflattering 
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reports on the state of reforms in the country. The 2009 Progress Report, for ex-
ample, reads as a damning indictment of incompetent and corrupt political elites, 
consumed by mutual bickering and oblivious to the real problems of the people 
(Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment, 2009):  
 Bosnia and Herzegovina has made very limited progress in addressing po-
litical criteria. The domestic political climate has deteriorated, and chal-
lenges to the proper functioning of the institutions and inflammatory rheto-
ric have continued. Reform implementation has been slow, due to a lack of 
consensus and political will, and to the complex institutional framework. 
A shared vision by the political leaders on the direction of the country 
and on key EU-related reforms remains essential for further progress to-
wards the European Union. (…) The European Union would not be able 
to consider an application for EU membership until the OHR has been 
closed. The reform of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitutional framework 
(…) is necessary before the Commission can recommend the granting of 
candidate status (…) Regarding democracy and the rule of law, there has 
been little progress towards creating more functional and efficient state 
structures (…) The functioning of the state-level executive and legislative 
bodies has been deficient. (…) The government institutions, at all levels, 
continued to be affected by internal political tensions and fragmented and 
uncoordinated policy-making. The authorities have often proven unable 
to quickly appoint high-level officials. (…) Some progress has been made 
in the area of public administration, but continued efforts are needed. (…) 
the fragmentation of the judicial system and the absence of a single budget 
continue to be major obstacles to reform in this area. Political interference 
remains frequent. (…) The authorities of Republika Srpska have increas-
ingly questioned the legality, jurisdiction and competences of the state-
level police and judicial agencies to operate in their territory. (…) Bosnia 
and Herzegovina has achieved little progress in the fight against corruption 
(…) There has been limited progress regarding human rights and protec-
tion of minorities. 
Virtually every Progress Report issued by the EU Commission since the 2009 
Report, quoted in the previous section, basically repeating the same findings. 
Almost a decade later, the 2018 Report, using almost identical language as the 
2009 Report argues that (Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, 2018): 
 The adoption of legislation stemming from the Reform Agenda, including 
adoption of the excise tax legislation, was negatively affected by tensions 
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Parliaments at state and entity levels, leading to a slowdown of the re-
form pace (…) Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitution remains in breach 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, as per the Sejdić-Finci and 
related cases (…) the functioning of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herze-
govina was affected by the expression of divergent positions by its indi-
vidual members on a number of issues under its competence over foreign 
policy (…) with the exception of a few reforms and the notable adoption 
of the excise legislation, delivery on a number of reforms was delayed by 
lack of agreement within the ruling coalition members (…) Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is at an early stage with the reform of its public administra-
tion and no progress has been achieved in the past year (…) corruption is 
widespread and remains an issue of concern.
This brief analysis of the of the modern political history of BiH demonstrates 
that the current political and social crisis has its roots in the war and post-war 
history and developments, and is not result of some ‘age-old hatreds’, as some 
have argued, mostly with the ulterior motive or proving that Bosnia amounts to 
little more than failed and ultimately unviable state. It could also be concluded 
that the current political system, which is the product of the Dayton Agreement, 
is plagued by a large number of systemic deficiencies and problems that could 
be classified into the following four broad categories: 1) constitutional or struc-
tural problems related to a flawed constitutional framework; 2) problems in the 
functioning of the government related to the said unresolved constitutional and 
structural issues (unlimited ethnic-based veto power, multiple and overlapping 
levels of government, huge administration presenting unbearable burden for the 
weak economy, etc.); 3) the divided loyalties of constituent peoples and resulting 
lack of unified vision for the country’s future; 4) lack of resources for the normal 
functioning of a state. Although significant advances have been made since the 
Dayton Agreement came into effect, the reform process has been stalled since the 
2006 general elections that brought Milorad Dodik to power in Republika Srpska 
for the second time. As a result, the country is now mired in its gravest political, 
economic and social crisis since the war.
Regardless of the gravity of situation in the country, the international community 
(now for all practical purposes embodied by the European Union) adopts a in-
decisive sit-and-wait attitude to the resolution of the country’s problems. This is 
to a certain extent caused by the general intervention fatigue in the international 
community, but also by the feeling that more twenty-five years after Dayton, the 
country has matured enough to take care of its own business. Such an attitude 
further compounds the belief that the sole cause of the country’s problems is 
corruption among the nationalist elites, who willingly protract the crisis in order 
to continue their sway over the politics. Such a view is true to a certain extent, 
chiefly on the micro-scale of day-to-day politics. However, such a simplistic view 
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fails to consider the fundamental flaw of the Dayton Constitution: the ability of 
each of the three sides to block any move they find detrimental to their interests. 
In addition, any moves towards making the central government more efficient 
and able to run the country are detrimental to the interests of nationalists ruling 
Republika Srpska, but in the past few years, Croat nationalist elites have begun 
to create problems as well. Continuing to stoke Serbs’ fears of being dominated 
by other ethnic groups in the best tradition of Milošević’s propaganda from the 
1990s, a small elite has successfully maintained its iron grip over Republika Srp-
ska. This recipe for an effective stay in power has been copied by the Croat na-
tionalists led by Dragan Čović and his political party HDZ. Republika Srpska has 
been ruled as virtual feudal fiefdom, where dissent is considered treason and a 
betrayal of ‘national interests’ ever since 2006. Again, Čović and the HDZ cop-
ied this tactic by establishing the so-called Croatian National Assembly (HNS 
– Hrvatski narodni sabor), a quasi-nongovernmental body, which effectively mo-
nopolized political life of Bosnian Croats. 
By controlling the political process on the central level, through frequent use of 
unlimited veto power given to them by the Dayton, Serb and Croat nationalist 
politicians are able to portray Bosnia as an impossible state and artificial creation 
where nothing will ever work and no agreement is possible. This, of course, is 
juxtaposed against Republika Srpska, where government rules by fiat and which 
government-controlled media is then able to portray as supposedly ‘the better 
part of BiH’. Since the establishment of the HNS, Čović has also used the same 
arguments to strengthen his hold on power and self-style himself and the HDZ as 
the sole bastion that stands between the Bosnian Croats and their utter ruin at the 
hands of majority Bosniaks. 
It is clear from the preceding brief expose of the issues affecting the country’s 
politics that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not equipped with the necessary legal and 
political instruments to break the impasse in a situation where one of the constitu-
tional ethnic groups is blocking the political process. No matter how reluctant the 
international community might be, breaking this deadlock will eventually neces-
sitate another decisive involvement by the EU and the United States, working in 
concert to amend the country’s faulty constitution. The only alternative to this is 
for the three sides to amicably reach an accord whereby the country’s central in-
stitutions will be empowered at the expense of the entities (an option which both 
Serb and Croat political elites are unlikely ever to agree to). The final alternative, 
one nobody wants to contemplate, is for the three sides to go their separate ways 
and complete the dissolution of the country, which is an option that would likely 
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